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THE CONCEPT OF “GOOD LAW”
by Krzysztof Pałecki
Establishing good law has been an old dream of humanity. Back in 
ancient times leaders such as Hammurabi, Solon, and especially Justinian 
the Great, and many others, while attempting to codify and reform the 
law, were driven by the ideal of “good law”. ! is same idea inspired Mon-
tesquieu in his De l’esprit des lois (“! e Spirit of the Laws”). Monumental 
legal acts in Napoleon’s times or the time of German unifi cation, as well 
as copying these acts into the legal systems of the countries of the Far East, 
for example, Japan, serve as additional examples on how tempted leaders 
have been able to implement the idea of “good law”, which, quite fre-
quently, is directly stated in the preamble to leading legal acts.
Today, the idea of “good law” can be found in almost all programs of 
more ambitious social organizations or political parties. ! is holds true 
especially for organizations with strong aspirations for social reform. ! e 
concept of “good law” has also received adequate refl ection from such 
prominent academic legal thinkers as Lon L. Fuller (1978), Herbert Hart 
(1977), Jospeh Raz (1979), Gustav Radbruch (2009), Robert Alex (2007) 
and many others.
Although an analysis of justifi cations of numerous parliamentary bills 
and the works of their commentators, which are dogmatic and legal in 
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nature, and which are written with a more or less intended objective to 
“cure the law” is beyond the scope of this paper, a certain generalization 
needs to be made: the greater the dynamics of social change, and the more 
rapid and radical this process is, the more expressed is the “program” 
postulate to change the law, or at least to “cure” it, “fi x” it, or create it anew; 
all, without doubt, to make it “better”, “more just”, “more adequate”, “ more 
modern”, “more eff ective”, “more legitimate” (or right), “ better represent-
ing interests” etc., etc. More than anything else the driving force behind 
these attempts is the desire to reach this, more or less explicit, ideal of 
“good law”. Numerous examples supporting this argument can be found 
in postulates, programs, and projects for legal reforms put forward during 
the system of transition in Eastern and Central European countries in the 
last two decades of the 20th century.
Interestingly, none of these attempts has yet received an adequate 
amount of general refl ection over the unquestionable postulate of “good 
law”. # at is why, in line with the presented argumentation, it seems 
enough for anybody attempting to establish and implement such “good” 
law to simply off er a guarantee that the desired social, economic and 
political order will be reached and maintained. Hence, a question: is such 
belief in the causative power of law, and even its omnipotence, fully justi-
fi ed given the theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence obtained in 
areas such as sociology of law, political science, economics, and more? 
Despite the importance of this issue, for the moment, it needs to be put 
aside. # e subject of this analysis focuses on the issue of what is “good 
law” and whether this concept is possible to implement.
Already in the early stage of the analysis serious problems with termi-
nology start to emerge. # ey all bring real consequences which primarily 
arise from diff erent understandings of law. In order to avoid an unneces-
sary confusion, some understandings of the concept of law, which are less 
relevant for the purpose of this analysis, will be omitted. # ey include: the 
concept of law as a form of psychological experience (for example the 
imperative-attributive emotions postulated by Leon Petrażycki), law as 
a “practice of local community” (for example Eugen Ehrlich’s “living law”), 
law as judicial decisions (as postulated by American realists), or – earlier 
– law as a “sui generis social fact” (compare Emil Durkheim’s theory) and 
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many others. While none of these approaches is the subject of this analy-
sis, it could nonetheless be interesting – although in each case for diff erent 
reasons, to at least undertake a discussion on the possibility of recreating 
– within the framework of these approaches – the methods and techniques 
proposed within them to improve law and diff erent ways of its intentional 
transformation to comply with the ideal of “good law”.
Such “reduction” among available defi nitions – performed for the 
purpose of scope of this analysis – allows an observation of two, still alive, 
traditions of understanding the law. First, of positivist origin, is the 
approach which leans towards the understanding of law as a collection 
(system) of legal regulations which are binding in a particular state 
(politically organized society) in marked physical territory and time. # e 
binding nature of these acts, that is their “legal” nature, is formally presup-
posed (prejudged) by fulfi lling a procedural process of their making (for 
example lawmaking procedures). Due to the scope of this analysis, it can 
only be highlighted that such seemingly obvious designators of the concept 
of “law” may create numerous problems once looked at more deeply. 
A more curious reader should refer to other works on the subject, includ-
ing a recent publication of Andrzej Grabowski (2009).
Despite many doubts, it is certain that, in this tradition, the designator 
of “law” is a collection of written statements of a specifi c origin, meaning, 
a way of articulation and ordering.
# e second tradition is of sociological (sociological-legal) origin, but 
has also greatly benefi ted from the theories developed within political 
science (as well as in other areas of the inquiry such as the theory of 
organization). From this perspective, “law” means also, or maybe fi rst of 
all, institutions which make, apply and execute regulations (norms) 
included in the above mentioned collection of statements. Hence, institu-
tions which are not understood – as o$ en encountered in legal language 
– as more or less coherent content (meaning) of one-subject regulations 
(norms), placed in legal acts, but rather according to a distinction once 
made by Tomasz Gizbert Studnicki (2001:130) who regarded institutions, 
similarly to theories in the anthropology of culture, as organizationally 
and materially distinguished groups of people with specifi c skills and with 
normatively established competence, fulfi lling, usually professionally, 
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particular functions in the framework of a particular social order (see 
Malinowski, 2001 (1926): 19). To complete the somewhat little convincing 
arguments of Donald Black (1976:2 and subsequent) it is here assumed 
that “law” is a specifi c collection of actions which includes in its designa-
tors structured agents who act in a specifi c way (see also Adamson Hoebel, 
1954:5).
On a side note, it is easily noticeable that attempts for a more precise 
defi nition of “law” in both of these understandings, will lead to a typical 
idem per idem mistake. According to the fi rst understanding, “law” as 
statements, the requirement (condition) which decided on what is to be 
regarded as “law” are the other statements, which are not law (especially 
regulations regulating procedures of law-making). Similarly in the second 
understanding, where “law” is understood as institutions (their function-
ing and consequences) whose belonging to the “legal system” is decided 
by these very same institutions (for example through processes of making 
legal regulations which prejudge this). A combined understanding of “law”, 
meaning particular institutions and statements remaining in ascertainable, 
mutually functional relations (the type of articulated legal regulations – 
processes of applying these regulations), would allow, although only up 
to a certain point, to avoid, or “dodge”, such a mistake. Remaining in the 
so-called “internal perspective of the legal system” – as coined by Hakan 
Hyden (2010) – allows for at least a somewhat correct defi nition of its 
certain elements (for example institutions applying law as institutions 
regarded as such in “specifi c legal regulations” without further need to 
prolong the “chain of defi nitions” for example by defi nition of these “legal 
regulations”.)
Due to an obvious lack of hope to obtain a commonly accepted answer, 
it is probably better to leave the philosophers with this perennial question 
what is law. Instead, let us return to the main question of this analysis, 
meaning the idea of “good law”. In the beginning ,we can easily state that 
should the designator of “law” be limited only to a collection of statements 
(legal regulations) then the concept of “good law” would either have to 
have defi ned and desired linguistic and formal characteristics (for exam-
ple a clear and precise language of articulation or a universal method of 
order ) or also (or only) the characteristics relating to the content (mean-
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ing) of the statement, for example being “just”, “right”, “rational”, “justifi ed”, 
etc. ! e scope, subject and methods of legal regulations, as well as appoint-
ing adequate agents to “improve” these regulations (legal acts), that is 
attempts to bring particular “law” closer to the ideal of “good law,” or even 
which already have helped fulfi ll this ideal in a satisfactory way, that is 
everything that comprises the implementation of the idea of “good law” 
is – at this time – entirely determined by a desired state of the form and 
content of normative statements. Another question arises: are legal regu-
lations, no matter how ideally articulated in their content and how sys-
tematically organized, the guarantee in “themselves” of their adequate 
usage and adequate compliance? Are they the real determinant of social 
order as shaped by these acts? Here serious doubts arise. A sociologist of 
law (or anybody who accepts the sociological perspective in the refl ection 
on law) will probably admit that the above mentioned content and formal 
characteristics of “law”, understood as a collection of normative state-
ments, are insuffi  cient to name it “good law” for the mere reason of the 
possibility of its ineff ective infl uence. Another reason would be the non-
eliminable discrepancy between the generalized, as a rule, objectives of 
legal regulations, assumed by the lawmaker and ad hoc, individual and 
specifi c objectives of institutions applying and executing these regulations. 
Undoubtedly, a radical legal positivist will claim it to be beyond the tasks 
included in the idea of creating a “good law”. Hans Kelsen, for instance, 
strongly discouraged a pursuit of one specifi c objective of law and by doing 
so eliminated from the discussion the problem of law’s eff ectiveness 
(1973: 34 and subsequent). And yet one can rightly point out that by 
making such a statement Kelsen largely and unjustifi ably simplifi ed the 
entire problem. ! e process of making “law” (in the form of legal acts and 
decisions which are based on them) is a product of many actions under-
taken by particular institutions, including actions which are unforeseen 
by procedures. What is more, these actions are not free of infl uence of 
other institutions outside the legal system. ! e real functioning of these 
institutions, which all comprise a “broader” (but also real and not only 
formal) lawmaker, their organization, substantial equipment, competence 
of people employed, as well as customs and motivation, beliefs and per-
sonalities, etc. are all a meaning for the quality (technical but also in terms 
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of content) of legal acts created. Accepting, all these consequences, the 
positivist view of law, one has to agree with a somewhat debatable state-
ment that implementation of the concept of “good law” is fully independ-
ent of the infl uence of personalities, organizational and substantial 
characteristics of institutions which create law. " is issue shall be discussed 
in greater detail further on in the analysis.
Nonetheless, an attempt to show a correlation between successful 
implementation of the concept of “good law” and the quality of legal 
institutions, as I suggested earlier, can be further complicated not only by 
the technical capability of these institutions, but also by their ethical 
(moral) assessment or, as some prefer, the “ethical legitimization” of law-
making. " is brings us down to the question whether a “hideous law-
maker”, a “hideous political system” (“hideous judge” etc.) can make “good 
law”, both in legislative and judicial terms? It is worth pointing out that 
this problem, which may give many sleepless nights to a few “legal moral-
ists” whose argumentation refl ects Radbruch’s concept of the ethical 
legitimization of law (2009:51, 74 and subsequent), may, in fact, turn out 
to be quite apparent. Calling lawmakers “hideous” not for their personal 
characteristics but the quality of law they introduce (that is as a conse-
quence of the negative assessment of the degree of its “goodness”) becomes 
morally relative and possible only when this “hideous” law is already 
a social fact, meaning a# er it has started bringing real eff ects. Unquestion-
ably, even before the process of lawmaking is completed, we may charac-
terize legislative and judicial institutions (or even present personal 
characteristics of people employed by them) as having bad, immoral, 
cynical, interest-driven, egoistic, etc. motivations and intentions and also 
present the process of lawmaking as corrupt. Nonetheless, it should be 
born in mind that for the assessment of law (understood as legal regula-
tions) created in such a way such characteristics can remain completely 
irrelevant. " ey are more a consequence of applying particular assessment 
criteria not to the law itself, but to these institutions or/and people. Dis-
regarding diff erent, irrelevant for this analysis, reasons for negative evalu-
ations of the lawmaker (such as personal grievances, ideological beliefs, 
and other) the assessment of the “producer” of law should be entirely based 
on the quality of the “product” and this assessment, in turn, should be 
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based on the social eff ects of the application of law. " at is why, it is dif-
fi cult to reject, a priori, the possibility of a situation where an otherwise 
“hideous” lawmaker, dishonest judge, corrupt civil servant, etc. will create, 
apply, and execute “good” – in its results – law. Following the same prin-
ciple a “noble lawmaker” an “honest judge”, and a “morally impeccable 
civil servant” may, just as well, create, apply, and execute “bad law”.
Even if such arguments are correct, it seems that the ethical (moral) 
assessment of lawmakers (diff erent than the assessment of the degree of 
their functionality) is not completely indiff erent to the possibility of 
implementing the concept of “good law”. Some doubts may appear from 
common observations and experience of the existence of a specifi c cor-
relation between particular personality features of the actors and the 
characteristics of the consequences of their actions. " at is why, we are 
prone to believe that morally deprived persons, even of high professional 
skills, cannot intentionally apply the law, which based not only on the 
ethical criteria, could be called “good”. " ese contestations are not neutral 
for establishing the way of implementing the concept of “good law”.
Going further one can notice that if “law,” understood as a collection 
of written statements, includes both applied acts and concrete decisions 
(for example judicial decisions) a paradoxical situation may emerge. Both 
attempts to improve law and make it “better”, that is to implement the 
concept of “good law”, can only take place ex post, meaning based on 
existing legal texts (both in the sense of their formally binding power and 
as applied in legal practice). Yet, such procedures would be impossible de 
lege ferenda. " ey are possible, however, in the texts of proposed laws (for 
example parliamentary bills). Yet, since the latter are not law, in a sense 
presented in this analysis, they cannot constitute a basis for eff ective legal 
decision-making (cf. A. Grabowski, 2009:69 and subsequent), although 
they may become an instrument for the implementation of the concept 
of “good law”. Even more diffi  cult is an attempt to improve the content 
and forms of future decisions made in the process of the application of 
the law. " is is not only because they do not yet exist as law but also 
because no one can ever be certain what their fi nal content will turn out 
to be (this is especially true with the so-called hard cases). On a margin, 
it is worth pointing out that lack of socially postulated legal regulations 
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(legal anomie) may result in their introduction, although this “gap fi lling” 
procedure does not necessarily translate into an implementation of the 
concept of “good law”.
Everything changes, however, when the term “law” (the system of law) 
includes – in accordance with sociological and legal approaches – institu-
tions which make, apply, and execute legal regulations and their real, and 
not only implied in the content of procedures, functioning. In terms of 
the implementation of the concept of “good law” this would also mean 
activities aimed at improving these institutions, even before they make 
any decisions to create legal regulations, not only through improving 
procedures, which would be obvious, but also through a real betterment 
of their work (for example by introducing better work organization, 
adequate technical equipment, improving workers’ qualifi cations, etc.). 
" e question; are any institutions, within this understanding of law (legal 
system), interested in such “realistic” improvement and do they have 
adequate qualifi cations, remains open to discussion. In the face of such 
a shortage, their creation would be yet another implementation of the 
concept of “good law”.
Visibly, diff erent ways of implementing the concept of “good law” get 
diff erentiated and complicated depending on the designators of the term 
“law”. It may sound slightly trivial. However, the earlier presented refl ec-
tions make less trivial the questions as who and in which way they should 
undertake the implementation of this concept. " e popular belief stating 
that this is a task only for lawyers leads to, I daresay, accepting in practice 
the worst possible strategy of improving law. " e possible source of such 
reasoning is a quite common monopoly on the knowledge about the 
practice of creating the legal order though legal regulations, which, tradi-
tionally, has been entrusted to the legal profession. Even if such an argu-
ment partially holds true, it is also true that law, regardless of its defi nition, 
is not a completely auto-creative, substantially independent and intrinsic 
creature. Contrary, it is, in this whole scope, dependent, although to dif-
ferent degrees, on political institutions and other social institutions. Hence, 
out of necessity, it is also instrumental. To eff ectively fulfi ll the function 
of creating social order requires more than the knowledge that is inherent 
in the legal profession, or the one that the lawyers are willing to use while 
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“improving law” (i.e. implementing the concept of “good law”). What is 
almost certain, however, is the fact that the lawyers are also interested in 
the kind of law that guarantees them certain professional (in some cases 
maybe even individual) privileges, protects inter-system interests and this 
is such a law which they, for obvious reasons, regard as “good law” (cf. 
Z. Zajdalo, 2009: 139).
Looking deeper one can notice that problems with the implementation 
of the concept of “good law” do not get any smaller when we try to answer 
the following question: “good law” but good for whom? Who is to be 
a benefi ciary of the process of bettering the law and who is to assess and 
evaluate the eff ects of this process?
Answers to these questions should be preceded by an assumption, 
maybe somewhat limiting, stating that “good law” (in both understandings 
of this term) is possible only in politically-organized communities (soci-
eties). Put it simply, in societies which have created professional, structured 
and a relatively stable political institution (cf. J.J. Wiatr, 1999: 13 and 
subsequently K. Pałecki, 2003: 209, and others). Unquestionably, these 
requirements are met by modern states, although not only. # ey are also 
met by inter-state and international organizations as well as ethnic com-
munities aspiring to statehood. By accepting such an assumption I ques-
tion the position of radical etatism which assigns lawmaking capabilities 
only to states, which are evidently counter-factual. I also do not agree with 
a radical approach in the anthropology of law postulating the concept of 
“primitive law” or “law older than legislation” (cf. F.A. Hayek, 1973: 72 
and subsequent). My opinion is based on a consistent lack of demarcation 
criteria, which allow distinguishing law from other social norms (customs, 
religion) and, additionally, for the reasons justifi ed by the subject of this 
analysis. “Primitive law”, as a rule it is regarded by those whom it governs, 
but also sometimes by those who undertake its description, as the best 
possible option; unquestionable, constantly noble, and legitimized by 
a stable praxis, hence not suitable to become the subject to any wider 
sanctions (cf. S.F. Moore, 1978: 13 and subsequent) . In this case, imple-
menting the concept of “good law” appears unnecessary; leaving alone the 
problem of lack of adequate institutions for its application. # at is why, 
there appears to be no need to further analyze this complex problem, 
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which, by the way, has been vastly covered in literature. Suffi  ce for the 
purpose of this analysis is an emerging, as a consequence of the previously 
accepted assumption, possibility to create a simple typology of categories 
of agents interested in “good law”. It compromises, in the fi rst place, the 
lawmakers (creators of legal regulations equipped with political power); 
in the second place, those controlling and executing the application of 
these regulations; that is in general everybody involved in the application 
of the law, and – in the third place – diffi  cult to distinguish, subordinate 
to lawmaking decisions of the fi rst and second categories, addressees of 
the law, deprived of an ability to directly create law. # is classifi cation, 
although not fully disjunctive, brings in new questions.
Most importantly, it provokes a refl ection over the concept (ideal) of 
a “universally good law”, that is law good for everybody included in the 
above typology (for example good for all citizens). I consider this is 
a utopian concept and base my opinion on two arguments. First, a prac-
tically impossible to overcome diffi  culty to fi nd objective measures of the 
degree of “goodness” of the legal system, meaning such measures and 
measuring techniques which are not interest-driven or designed to pro-
tect the position of one of the categories: the lawmakers, the implement-
ers and executors of law, or the addressees of the law. # e second 
argument, easy to justify by numerous observations of political practices, 
is an unquestionably instrumental treatment of law by political institu-
tions, which use law as a means to succeed in their objectives, programs, 
protect interests, fulfi ll “obligations”, etc. # eir common social acceptance, 
let alone a chance of reaching a consensus omnium, is rather exceptional 
in the culturally diverse, socially complex contemporary society. Govern-
ance in accordance with what once Hanna Ardent (1969) referred to as 
act in concert is also of a utopian nature. Hence, most o$ en the attempts 
to improve law will take place in accordance with the program (objectives, 
goals and interests) formulated by political institutions. Consequently, 
new law will rather be “good for the government” or, at most, if a com-
promise is reached between the interests of the lawmakers and the 
addressees of the law, it will be “acceptable to the government and the 
citizens”. Depending on the level of autonomy of the legal system, that is 
its organizational and functional independence of political institutions, 
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as well as the degree of isolation from public opinion (demands, postu-
lates of legal civic associations), law, in the sense of regulations included 
in legal acts and decisions for their application, can be turned into “good”, 
that is in accordance with the beliefs and images of the legal institutions 
themselves, adequately for the scope of this, always limited, autonomy. It 
is also quite possible, especially in democratic systems, for some infl uen-
tial associations to force the lawmakers (political institutions) as well as 
the institutions which apply the law to implement the concept of “good 
law”, although “good” only for a selected social group, i.e. the one repre-
sented by these associations, the addressees. " is is, quite o# en, the way, 
actually quite eff ective, through which the labour unions operate. Hence, 
undoubtedly, both the program and the implementation of the concept 
of “good law” is under pressure by particular categories of a politically-
organized society. For this reason, improvement of law depends on the 
net infl uence of political institutions, legal institutions and civic associa-
tions. " at is why, as some tend to believe, the best, if not the only way, 
to make and implement “good law”, meaning law free of infl uence of 
particular interests, is an institutionally-organized deliberation between 
all potential addressees of a regulation, which may create, at all stages of 
the legislative process, binding consequences for formal lawmakers (cf. 
M. Stepień, 2009: 187 and subsequent). Such deliberation assumes, how-
ever, that all social confl icts, which are envisioned to be legally regulated, 
can be solved, or at least partially solved, through discourse and worked-
out compromises acceptable to all participants of the discourse. It also 
assumes a fi nal conclusiveness of such a discourse, at least to the point 
allowing a formulation of adequate legal regulations. Both assumptions 
are debatable. A social discussion on problems, which can be solved by 
means of a legal act, as well as a debate over the “improvement” of law, 
are o# en used for expressing emotions, releasing social pressures caused 
by these problems, or – at times – just to make an impression of active 
participation in the process of law creation, or – however less o# en – for 
some other reason. Lack of conclusiveness of such debates is o# en 
a planned eff ect of manipulation of political institutions, which are inter-
ested in avoiding, uncomfortable legislative decisions, as long ago 
described by Machiavelli (1969 (1532): 41) and brought back to the 
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contemporary political science by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz 
through their analyses of the so-called non decision making (1962:947-52). 
In my opinion, the greatest diffi  culty in using the open discourse to make 
“good law” lies in the fact that law may be easier infl uenced by diff erent 
manipulations than procedural attempts designed for their elimination.
Summing up, it appears that even the most honest and serious eff orts 
to make “good law” may, at best, be partially benefi cial to one group of the 
social structure, and substantially, only to one fragment of the social order. 
# e idea of the law “good for everybody” is as attractive as it is unreach-
able. In this way, through refl ection over such questions as “how to 
understand law?” and “what are the categories of its benefi ciaries?” we 
have come closer to another important issue: establishing criteria to assess 
both the existing law and the one that is still being envisioned, both in 
terms of the degree of implementation of the concept of “good law”. 
“Good”, obviously means “good” to a certain point (in part), or “good” in 
some aspects, while a law deprived of some characteristic ascribed by these 
criteria becomes a “bad law” (completely bad, bad to a certain point, bad 
in some aspects, etc). Only a categorized possibility to make such assess-
ments allows the analyzed concept of “good law” to make any sense.
Historically, the assessment of the law was a  typical “transferred” 
qualifi cation (cf. Pałecki, 1978: 209 and subsequent). # e same can be said 
about our times, and it would not refer to a rare phenomenon. In the 
Hobbesean tradition the quality of law is decided on by the assessment of 
the sovereign who makes or executes this law. # e task of this assessment 
is given to the sovereign’s subjects. Particular attention is paid to the 
sovereign’s ability to maintain “social order” through eff ective execution 
of law, which he had initially made (Leviathan, 1962 (1651): 241 and 
subsequent). In modern times, especially in Europe, starting with the 
bourgeois revolutions, an important role was played by the popularity of 
an opinion on the degree of fulfi lling the legitimate requirements by the 
sovereign to execute power, which also means making and executing law. 
A refusal of granting such legitimization, just like its approval, was an 
opinion on the “quality” of law, practically without much regard to the 
content of regulations or the method of their application in the social 
order. It was at that time particularly when of particular attractiveness was 
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the Roman principle dura lex sed lex. On the other hand, representatives 
of the historical school of German law were, still at the end of the 19th 
century, arguing that law “in itself ” was principally something good and 
benefi cial (in the tradition of Ulpain’s ius est ars boni at aequi ). Critique 
of this assumption, when brought up, (for example in populist ideologies 
or the works of socialist thinkers) focused only on the lack of particular 
social characteristics among the lawmakers, which would legitimize them 
to make “good” law or any law. ! e quality of law created (executed) by 
“the government”, “the ruling class”, “the bourgeois”, “the elite”, etc. was, 
hence, a direct consequence the addressees’ belief that those in power had 
adequate qualifi cations to make law. In this way, the assessment of the 
broadly understood “lawmakers” (positive or negative) was “transferred” 
to their legislative outcomes (legal regulations, implementing procedures, 
etc.). Seemingly even today the criterion of the legitimization of lawmak-
ers serves as a “reference point” in the assessments of the degree of “good-
ness” of a particular law. And the fact that the subject of so formulated 
assessment is not the law itself, but rather of  lawmaking institutions 
(and – out of necessity – also political institutions), does not seem to 
bother anyone.
! e 20th century brought a large number of works of philosophers and 
theoreticians of law which focused – entirely or occasionally – on the 
problem of relations between legal and moral regulations (while the latter 
are o# en associated with authoritarian and postulational concepts of 
morality, that is with ethical norms). ! is fact is brought up as a result of 
placing the word “good” (which – naturally – is contrasted with “bad”) in 
the title of this analysis. However, presenting even a brief summary of the 
works on this subject would not be possible without a serious violation of 
their framework. As a pars pro toto let us refer to H.L.A. Hart’s ! e Concept 
of Law with a very relevant introduction by Jan Woleński ( 1998: XXIII, 
251 and subsequent), D. Lyon’s Ethics and the Rule of Law (2000: 9 and 
subsequent, 59 and subsequent), or H. Izdebski’s Elements of ! eory and 
Philosophy of Law (2008: 258). ! e 20th century also witnessed a renewed 
interest in legal and natural relations, especially as approached by the 
theorists of international public law (for example the problem of human 
rights and civil rights – see J.  Habermas, 2009: 13 and subsequent, 
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J. Woleński, 2006: 31). Consequently, ethical (moral and legal-natural) 
criteria of law assessment which were highlighted were based on a certain 
(usually undefined) concept of justice and righteousness (see 
B.  Wojciechowski, M.  Golecki, 2008: 10 and subsequent). In some 
approaches a return to Roman principles could be seen only to deprive 
certain legal regulations, which, by the way, complied with formal require-
ments of abiding law, of the role of “being law”. # is was achieved through 
bringing back, into the argument, the Aurelian maxim lex iniustissima non 
est lex, which later became the foundation of Radbruch’s critique of the 
“totalitarian law” (2009: 36 and subsequent) or Paullus’ warning non omne 
quod licet in legibus honestum est, which became the basis for Hayek’s 
“objective of law” Hayek (1973: 12). From the perspective of the imple-
mentation, the concept of the “good law”, as long as its desired qualities 
such as “justice”, “righteousness”, “common good”, are not specifi ed 
operationally (and not only contextually, postulationally , or protectively) 
they are simply useless. It is just impossible to formulate practical direc-
tives of implementing “good law”, or directives of sanctions of the already 
existing legal regulations, which could be clearly interpreted from the 
morally ambiguous assessments of law. Such assessments may equally well 
justify a lawmaking directive “A” with a directive which is contradicting 
it. # is, of course, does not mean that such assessments are not under-
taken. Of course, they are and, what is more, frequently become a hidden 
“missing premise” of the decision made in the process of the application 
of the law (K. Pałecki, 2004: 17 and subsequent).
Worth presenting are also other arguments supporting a shortcut “deal-
ing” with this quite apragmatic, as I believe, although popular belief that 
the decision on whether a particular law is good or bad is dependent on 
the coherence (accordance) of its content with the norms of descriptive 
and/or normative morality. # ese “norms” – as I have earlier argued – suf-
fer from an ineradicable illness: they are always indefi nable (cf. J. Stelmach, 
B. Brożek, 2011: 47, I.C. Kamiński, 2003). It means that the number of 
opportunities to fulfi ll them is not only very large, but also unlimited. 
Consequently, the assessment whether in a particular case the moral 
“norm” was fulfi lled or violated, is unavoidably relative and subjective. 
Beyond the scope of this paper is the enumeration of all reasons behind 
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this shortcoming, which can, at times, be the reason not to regard them 
as norms (at least as “complete” norms), but rather a separate category of 
general behavioral directives (cf. Pałecki 2003: 43). It is suffi  ce to point to 
one, although ineradicable. Unquestionably, moral “norms” are used to 
implement (create, multiply, protect) generalized values such as: “good”, 
“justice”, “honesty” etc. # ese values can, in the social order, be won (pro-
tected, multiplied) in an unlimited number of times (in this sense they are 
inexhaustible). What is more, in practice, they can be achieved, depending 
on the circumstances, in many ways (in this sense they are sporadic). # ese 
characteristics explain the lack of a universal code of moral or ethical 
behaviour, which, if complied with, would guarantee an unquestionable 
achievement of these values within a particular society. # ere are many 
reasons to call someone good, modest or just. However, without a doubt, 
there always will be people who will, for diff erent reasons, refuse to assign 
these qualities to a person who deserves them. More importantly, the 
requirements of “moral” norms are quite o% en ambivalent. Meeting the 
requirements of a “just judgment” can be impossible to balance with the 
requirement of active compassion. It is probably safe to say that no human 
society has such a collection of moral directives which would not include 
a ban on killing other human beings. And yet, as it is well-known, there 
are communities, who, despite their respect for such a ban, do not con-
demn certain kinds of homicides or even fi nd reasons for their praising 
(examples include: revenge killings, killing a criminal who was caught 
red-handed, killing a “traitor” etc). In Poland, there are many attempts to 
implement the Constitutional obligation to “implement the principles of 
social justice” (Article 2). However, some of these attempts, although 
obtained by legal means are quite controversial and o% en, as confi rmed 
by the legal practice, the application of one excludes (limits) the applica-
tion of another (cf. S. Tkacz, 2008: 21 and subsequent). Similar examples 
are large in numbers. Summing up: moral “norms” as a criterion of the 
degree of “goodness” of law, due to the method of regulation as well as its 
subject matter, are too unclear to serve as a basis for an assessment of law, 
which could further serve as establishing “adequate” implementation of 
the concept of “good law”. Put it diff erently. An arbitrarily decision on how 
to implement this concept, as well as abstaining from such an attempt, 
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will fi nd, without problems, justifi cation in a moral assessment of law. 
Beyond the scope of this paper it is a discussion on other diffi  culties aris-
ing from applying moral criteria in such assessments, for example, estab-
lishing the level of coherence between the content of legal norms and 
moral directives.
# e same may, although not necessarily, be said about religious norms 
when treated as a criterion used in the assessment of the degree of “good-
ness” of law. Religious norms tend to be quite undefi ned, but also the 
opposite, very precise and even casuistic in their demands (for example 
the Koran laws banning the consumption of pork and alcohol). Nonethe-
less, even in cases when religious norms straightforwardly establish specifi c 
duties of conduct, there still may be problems with applying them as 
a criterion to assess law. Some individuals’ rejection of faith or even its 
mere questioning (as, for example, in the case of the atheists or reformers) 
deprives this criterion of legitimacy to create a binding assessment of law. 
# e argumentation goes: “since I do not believe in God, then why should 
I follow his orders while instituting law”. Of course theological “recom-
mendations” may be given adequate consideration in the process of law-
making for other than their origin reasons (for example due to a real or 
implied eff ectiveness in preventive illnesses, eff ective procreation, stabil-
ity of family relations, etc.). However, in these cases, they become com-
pletely diff erent criteria of law assessment (for example, the criteria which 
refer to medical, psychological, sociological knowledge, etc.). It is worth 
pointing out that with the exception of the most radical theological doc-
trines, and in cases where religion is tightly integrated with the legal 
system, nobody questions the fact that the non-believers or secular insti-
tutions can make good law.
Accepting a broader perspective, which is not limited to morality and 
religion, we can notice that accepting the content of any norm, other than 
legal norms, as a criterion for assessing legal norms can pose serious dif-
fi culties in cases when implementing the concept of “good law” leads to 
some sort of innovation. In cases, when these other norms show an already 
signifi cant inertia and, what is more, have become common and internal-
ized “for a long time” in a given society, any attempt to introduce, by means 
of law, a new conduct model, could be assessed as a deterioration, and not 
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an improvement, of the current state of law. ! is could happen even in 
cases, when –based on well-documented knowledge – it is clear that new 
law could prove to be, for various reasons, better than the existing one (cf. 
M.B. Arctowa, 1967:236). As a rule, morality and religion, more than law, 
appear to be less susceptible to innovative changes.
Moral (ethical) criteria of assessing the degree of “goodness” of law, 
meaning the criteria which are external to the legal system, should not be 
confused with the criteria comprising the so-called internal morality of 
law, as in the well-known concept of Lon Fuller (2004). ! e case in ques-
tion is a collection of principles established by lawyers, particularly in 
practice and judicial refl ection, whose violation undermines the duty to 
abide legal regulations (legal decisions) and makes law not as much “mor-
ally bad” but “possible to question in terms of abiding” and, as a result, 
ineff ective. A typical example of such validative functioning of “internal” 
legal principles is, for example, a commonly respected canon: lex non 
obligat nisi promulgate (law is not obligatory unless it is promulgated, or 
in a  stricter version, faultily promulgated). Nonetheless, one cannot 
exclude that the implementation of the concept of “good law” may, to some 
degree, translate into implementation of requirements included in those 
“internal” principles of law. Paradoxically, accepting the principles of 
“internal morality of law” as a basis for implementing the concept of “good 
law” is not so obvious. ! is is due to the fact that they establish certain 
standards whose fulfi llment turns particular legal regulations (decisions) 
into law in general, as opposed to its substitute, an ersatz of law, and even 
“lawlessness in the form of law”. ! ese are the characteristics of the tout 
court law, any law deserving this name, which is later, due to its other 
characteristics and assessment criteria, can turn out to be both a “good” 
and a “bad” law (obviously with a certain acceptance of the grading of 
such assessment). ! ere is yet another obstacle to the application of prin-
ciples of internal morality of law to its possible improvement, that is each 
of those accepted principles is later “excluded” from application in practice 
through diff erent lex specialis, that is “unusual”, “extraordinary”, “tempo-
rary”, “transitioning” regulations, which are always more detailed than the 
principles and quite o$ en justifi ed by such beliefs as: the existing law is in 
danger of being spoilt or a “bad law” is being created (that is, for example, 
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the one which is created for political gain). ! e principles of “internal 
morality of law” are constantly accompanied by hypocritical behaviour of 
lawmakers: none of them undermines their legitimacy but, at the same 
time, it is impossible to fi nd a system of legal acts, which would not include 
any exceptions to these requirements.
! e “internal morality of law” is related to the principles of “technical” 
qualities of the legal system, that is a logical and transparent order of legal 
acts, clarity of language, coherence of requirements included in provisions, 
etc. In this case, “good law” would have to meet the requirements of the 
so-called legislative technique, which, in its evaluation, would allow us to 
ignore the content of the provisions. Such an approach is diffi  cult to rec-
oncile with a common belief that “good law” is such law whose substantial 
requirements remain in accordance with commonly accepted axiological 
beliefs. ! e fact that law, which is “good” in a formal sense (technically, 
procedurally, and in terms of eff ectiveness) can easily prove to be substan-
tially (that is in terms of content) “bad” is rather a commonplace. ! e real 
problem lies in fi nding an answer to the question whether it is possible to 
achieve a substantially good law (meaning such law which is axiomatically 
accepted by its addressees and judicial institutions), with a simultaneous 
negligence of its desired formal qualities (technical, instrumental). It is 
easy to notice that this is a more detailed version of a question already 
asked; meaning whether poorly, faultily functioning institutions applying 
the law can create a substantially “good” law?
I dare provide a negative answer to this question. Even the most justi-
fi ed regulations, yet poorly formulated, violate system principles of order-
ing, promulgation procedures, etc. ! ey also lose their substantial 
justifi cation in the process of their application due to formal inadequacies 
(shortcomings). ! ey will gradually, and maybe unavoidably, become 
subject to a content depreciation (por. A. Michalska, S. Wronkowska, 
1983: 167). Hence is a need for subsequent “remedial” functional inter-
pretations, which can not only completely modify, but also eliminate 
original intentions of lawmakers. I would suggest that such a threat be 
taken seriously, especially by those impatient and “effi  cient” legislators 
who are driven by the rule “let us fi rst make a necessary law and later 
worry about its cosmetic polishing”.
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Analogically to technical fl aws of legal regulations, dysfunctional 
institutions, that is those which are incompetent, poorly-organized, 
poorly-equipped, unable to keep certain personal standards, but which 
apply and execute law, can, in the process of making individual and con-
crete decisions, very easily devalue a substantially and formally “well” 
formulated law. " is could happen, for example, due to corruption. In 
implementing the principle of “good law” it is impossible – which should 
be stressed time and again – to ignore organizational, technical and per-
sonality characteristics of legal institutions, meaning the same character-
istics as those applicable to political institutions, and concentrate only on 
a formal and substantial quality of legal regulations.
To complete the existing typology of criteria of assessment of legal acts, 
let us refer to two criteria, which are quite o# en confused (mixed together), 
namely: eff ectiveness and economy of law. Both of these criteria fi nd 
a relatively large space in the contemporary discourse of legal science (see 
J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, W. Załuski, 2007). Let us assume, with a certain 
necessary simplifi cation, that eff ective law (and depending on the degree 
of this eff ectiveness adequately “good” or “bad”) is such law whose appli-
cation leads to reaching a desired outcome with a greater degree of prob-
ability than a haphazard or unexceptional one. In turn, for law to be an 
economic means such as an application of a legal act which results in a gain 
(in an economic sense), that is; its eff ect is of a greater market value than 
the quantitatively measured inputs necessary to obtain it. " e size of this 
gain also marks the degree in which the law which was “implemented” 
for its achievement is assessed as “good” or “bad”. However, both criteria 
are quite problematic. " e most eff ective law can easily be used to achieve 
non-noble, undesirable aims (which are unethical) and it is – from diff er-
ent sources – known that law o# en achieves such eff ectiveness through 
applying particularly strict and diffi  cult to accept sanctions. Hence, eff ec-
tive law may become “bad law” – while accepting all but theological cri-
teria – which is the reason, why it is eff ective. Keeping in mind that the 
winding roads of policy-making sometimes allow for situations in which 
it “makes sense” for politicians to apply the law in a way which is planned 
to be ineff ective, at least for reasons for which it was introduced, but which 
is eff ective for other reasons, which are usually covered. An example: 
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gaining popularity among the voters. Putting aside such practices, the 
assessment of the eff ectiveness of law remains an uneasy task for the fol-
lowing reasons: its goals are either gradual and cannot be subject to an 
objective observation, or are of a dynamic, changeable nature.
A reduction of the concept of “good law” to the application of eff ective 
law depends on accepting certain, not always revealed, and somewhat 
dubious assumption that the lawmakers, while formulating normative 
regulations, have a good enough knowledge on the relations between 
activities undertaken for implementing requirements imposed by these 
regulations and the emergence of the planned (desired) results. In other 
words, the problem of eff ective legislation is limited to adequate diligence 
in obtaining good knowledge (infallible in terms of cause-and-eff ect 
propositions) and its adequate application in the content of the regulations 
and norms. And yet, a casual observation of the eff ects of legislative pro-
cesses leads to an assumption that even regulations included in the so-
called technical norms (hence, norms which oblige their addressees to 
apply technologies derived from advances in diff erent scientifi c disciplines 
(especially natural sciences) can lead to consequences which are both 
undesirable and unwelcomed. And what would happen if we completely 
entrusted the engineers of social sciences? In social sciences, there are 
constant methodological disputes regarding the adequacies of formulated 
sentences (theories), which suggests that lawmaking institutions would 
have to be competent enough to select statements (theories, predictions, 
expertise, recommendations) which are “the best” from “all available”, 
which are o# en of a confl icting message, before they could decide to 
articulate the content for normative regulations as based on such theories. 
Diffi  culties with an adequate application of judicial expertise, which are 
well-known to all lawyers, prove that fulfi lling this requirement would not 
be realistic.
Similar objections can be directed towards accepting the criterion of 
the “economy of law” as the one which decides on the degree to which 
a particular law is “good”. Additionally, this criterion is not applicable when 
the “profi ts,” resulting (expected) from the application (abiding) of legal 
regulations, are not of a quantitative nature, or are not transferable into 
any kind of good (it cannot be used in market transactions of goods and 
58 KRZYSZTOF PAŁECKI 
services). Examples: when a “profi t” of an applied law is an increased trust 
in public administration or an increased sense of safety. It is easy to notice 
that “good law” in an economic sense – just like eff ective law – can simul-
taneously introduce and execute regulations which are not acceptable in 
a particular system of ethics (ideological, religious) or by commonly 
accepted moral beliefs (for example, capital punishment for the crime of 
ineff ective economic management, which is foreseen and executed by the 
legal system in the People’s Republic of China). In these cases, we are 
dealing with “bad law”.
Summing up, an abstract concept of making “good law” is not transfer-
able into any practical directives. Its nature is that of an emotive message. 
# e reasons for its postulate are outside the legal system and attempt at 
creating specifi c social reactions (for example gaining voters’ support). 
# e concept of “good law” can be given a pragmatic sense only by specify-
ing the vision of desired social order for which “law” (legal system) will 
be used as an implementation instrument. Not the only one, but a crucial 
one. In turn, a desired social order will easily become another foggy idea 
or a subject of interest-based manipulation, if it is not derived from a pre-
cisely articulated order of values and objectives, i.e. axiological order, 
which is to be applied. Although not a necessary and suffi  cient condition, 
particular features of an axiological order decide on the degree of ade-
quateness of this “derivation”. Overly generalizing the values-objectives, 
which are to be reached by means of law, and disregarding the order of 
mutual relations inside the collection of such values, especially individual 
values, which mark the sequence of activities undertaken to “improve law”, 
occasionally, dictated by “current interests”, introduction to this collection 
of “alternative” values, there are only a few faults of the axiological order, 
which result in its complete or signifi cant apragmatism. Additionally, 
I believe that the idea of axiologically (ideologically) neutral making, or 
even more, applying of the law, which can constantly be heard in projects 
proposed at improving the law and which is “good” due to its immanent, 
formal and substantial qualities, is a utopia. At the same time, I believe 
that using basic ethical categories for the assessment of law, its “good” or 
“bad” nature, is a misunderstanding resulting from a mental shortcut and 
a particular facon de parler used in oral speeches. An assessment of exist-
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ing or/and foreseen eff ects of law, substantial and non-substantial, is 
automatically transferred to the law itself, in the content of regulations, 
and actions undertaken by institutions. And yet, the “law” itself, and even 
a particular legal norm, is almost never “assigned” to an individual objec-
tive (value-objective) or to an individual result of its application. It can 
also be of intrinsic value, not necessarily an instrumental one. Although 
it is always used to achieve something and, from the perspective of par-
ticular ethics or/and morality, this “something” can be more adequately 
decided on whether it is “good” or “bad”. And yet despite this fact, the 
transfer of assessment of the eff ects of law on the law itself (a norm, an 
institution) is a far-reached simplifi cation and assumes an existence of 
a casual relation between fulfi lling legal requirements and an emergence 
of specifi c social facts (phenomena). # is relationship quite o$ en has to 
be excluded in more thorough investigations. # e process of evaluating 
law, which is an exit point for the process of implementing the concept of 
“good law”, resembles an evaluation of other much simpler instruments. 
Consider a knife. When used for slicing bread, a knife can generate only 
positive assessments. However, the very same knife, used as a murder 
weapon, generates the opposite assessments. Commonly we would say that 
in the fi rst case the knife is “good” and “bad” in the second case, although 
its qualities have, in fact, not changed. In reality, the knife is neither “good” 
nor “bad”. It is sharp or blunt, short or long, etc. For this reason, it has 
diff erent kinds of usefulness which determine (casually) for which purpose 
it will be used. # us, maybe the concept of “good law” should be under-
stood similarly, not directed to the legal system itself, but rather to the real 
intentions of the lawmakers. # en the assessment of law could be reduced 
to the assessment of the degree of its application in the implementation of 
intended goals, this time already “good” or “bad”, and consequently the 
same assessment of those who plan to implement their intended goals by 
means of law. An implementation of the concept of “good law” would then 
be a procedure focused on creating the awareness of the latter. Finally, by 
making a rather large circle of thoughts, we are returning to a rather old 
idea: law is as “good” as the sovereign who makes it.
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